DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Office of the Secretary 49 CFR part 23 and 26 [Docket OST-97-2550 ; Notice 97- 5 ] RIN 2105-AB92 Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of Transportation Programs AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DOT ACTION: Final rule SUMMARY: This final rule revises the Department of Transportation's regulations for its disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) program. The DBE program is intended to remedy past and current discrimination against disadvantaged business enterprises, ensure a "level playing field" and foster equal opportunity in DOT-assisted contracts, improve the flexibility and efficiency of the DBE program, and reduce burdens on small businesses. This final rule replaces the former DBE regulation, which now contains only the rules for the separate DBE program for airport concessions, with a new regulation. The new regulation reflects President Clinton's policy to mend, not end, affirmative action programs. It modifies the Department's DBE program in light of developments in case law requiring "narrow tailoring" of such programs and last year's Congressional debate concerning the continuation of the DBE program. It responds to comments on the Department's December 1992 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and its May 1997 supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM). DATES: This rule is effective [insert date 30 days from date of publication in the Federal Register]. Comments on Paperwork Reduction Act matters should be received by [insert date 60 days from date of publication in the Federal Register]; however, late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable. ADDRESSES: Persons wishing to comment on Paperwork Reduction Act matters (see discussion at end of preamble) should send comments to Docket Clerk, Docket No. OST-97-2550, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Room 4107, Washington, DC 20590. We emphasize that the docket is open only with respect to Paperwork Reduction Act matters, and the Department is not accepting comments on other aspects of the regulation. We request that, in order to minimize burdens on the docket clerk's staff, commenters send three copies of their comments to the docket. Commenters wishing to have their submissions acknowledged should include a stamped, self-addressed postcard with their comments. The docket clerk will date stamp the postcard and return it to the commenter. Comments will be available for inspection at the above address from 10 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert C. Ashby, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Room 10424, Washington, DC 20590, phone numbers (202) 366-9306 (voice), (202) 366-9313 (fax), (202) 755-7687 (TDD), bob.ashby@ost.dot.gov (email); or David J. Goldberg, Office of Environmental, Civil Rights and General Law, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Room 5432, Washington, DC 20590, phone number (202)366-8023(voice), (202)366-8536 (fax). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The Department has the important responsibility of ensuring that firms competing for DOT-assisted contracts are not disadvantaged by unlawful discrimination. For eighteen years, the Department's most important tool for meeting this responsibility has been its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program. This program began in 1980. Originally, the program was a minority/women's business enterprise program established by regulation under the authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other nondiscrimination statutes that apply to DOT financial assistance programs. See 49 CFR part 23. In 1983, Congress enacted, and President Reagan signed, the first statutory DBE provision. This statute applied primarily to small firms owned and controlled by minorities in the Department's highway and transit programs. Firms owned and controlled by women, and the Department's airport program, remained under the original 1980 regulatory provisions. In 1987, Congress enacted, and President Reagan signed, statutes expanding the program to airports and to women-owned firms. In 1991 (for highway and transit programs) and 1992 (for airport programs), Congress enacted, and President Bush signed, statutes reauthorizing the expanded DBE program. After each statutory amendment, and at other times to resolve program issues, the Department amended part 23. The result has been that part 23 has become a patchwork quilt of a regulation. In addition, years of interpretation by various grantees and different DOT offices has created confusion and inconsistency in program administration. These problems, particularly in the area of certification, were criticized in General Accounting Office reports. The Department's desire to improve program administration and make the rule a more unified whole led to our publication of a December 1992 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). The Department received about 600 comments on this NPRM. The Department carefully reviewed these comments and, by early 1995, had prepared a draft final rule responding to them. However, in light of the Supreme Court's June 1995 decision in Adarand v. Peña and the Administration's review of affirmative action programs, the Department conducted further review of the DBE program. As a result, rather than issuing a final rule, we issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) in May 1997. This SNPRM incorporated responses to the comments on the 1992 NPRM and proposed further changes in the program, primarily in response to the "narrow tailoring" requirements of Adarand. We received about 300 comments on the SNPRM. The Department has carefully considered these comments, and the final rule responds to them. The final rule also specifically complies with the requirements that the courts have established for a narrowly tailored affirmative action program. At the same time that the Department was working on this final rule, Congress once again considered reauthorization of the DBE program. In both the House and the Senate, opponents of affirmative action sponsored amendments that would have effectively ended the program. In both cases, bipartisan majorities defeated the amendments. The final highway/transit authorization legislation, known as the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), retains the DBE program. In shaping this final rule, the Department has listened carefully to what both supporters and opponents of the program have said in Congressional debates. Key Points of the Final Rule This discussion reviews and responds to the SNPRM comments and the Congressional debates on certain key issues. Congressional debate references are to the Congressional Record for March 5 and 6, 1998, for the Senate debate and April 1, 1998, for the House debate, unless otherwise noted. 1. Quotas and Set-Asides. SNPRM Comments Most comments on this issue came from non-DBE contractors, who argued that the program was a de facto quota program. Many of these contractors said that recipients insisted that they meet numerical goals regardless of other considerations, and that the recipients did not take showings of good faith efforts seriously. Some non-DBE contractor organizations argued, in addition, that the program was a quota program because it was based on a statute that had a 10 percent target for the use of businesses defined by a racial classification. Congressional Debate Opponents of the DBE program generally asserted that it created quotas or set-asides. Senator McConnell described the entire program, particularly the provision that "not less than 10 percent" of authorized funds go to DBEs, as a $17.3 billion quota. In other words, if the government decides that you are the preferred race and gender, then you are able to compete for $17.3 billion of taxpayer-funded highway contracts. But, if you are the wrong race and gender, then - too bad - you can't compete for that $17 billion pot. (S1936). The "not less than 10 percent" language also led opponents, such as Senator Ashcroft, to label the program a "set-aside," (S1405), a term also employed in testimony provided by a law professor from California who said that the statute "imposes a set-aside that's required regardless of the availability of race-neutral solutions." (S1407). Senator Gorton said that the DBE statute provides that "those not defined as disadvantaged in our society are absolutely barred and prohibited from getting certain governmental contracts." (S1415). On the other hand, supporters of the program were adamant that it was not a quota program. Senator Baucus argued that the program, as implemented by DOT, allows substantial flexibility to recipients and contractors. Recipients could have an overall goal other than 10 percent under current rules, he pointed out. Senator Kerry of Massachusetts added that what the statute does is to "set a national goal. And it is appropriate in this country to set national goals for what we will do to try to break down the walls of discrimination...." (S1408). He also alluded to the flexibility of the Secretary to permit overall goals of less than 10 percent. Senator Robb stated I want to stress at the outset that this program is not a "quota program," as some have suggested. There is a great difference [between] an aspirational goal and a rigid numerical requirement. Quotas utilize rigid numerical requirements as a means of implementing a program. The DBE program uses aspirational goals. (S1425). With respect to individual contract goals, Senator Baucus said, "once a goal is established for a contract, each contractor must make a good-faith effort to meet the goal - not mathematically required, not quota required, but a good faith effort to meet it." (S1402). Senator Baucus pointed to provisions of the SNPRM concerning overall goals, means of meeting them, and good-faith efforts as further narrowly tailoring the program. The SNPRM confirms, he said, that "contract goals are not binding. If a contractor makes good faith efforts to find qualified women or minority-owned subcontractors, but fails to meet the goal, there is no penalty." (S1403). Senator Robb added that "Contract goals are not operated as quotas because they require that the prime contractor make 'good faith efforts' to find DBEs. If a prime contractor cannot find qualified and competitive DBEs, the goal can be waived." (S1425). One of the Senators who addressed the quota/set-side issue in the most detail was Senator Domenici. He concluded that "I do not agree that this minority business program we have in this ISTEA bill before us is a program that mandates quotas and mandates set-asides." (S1426). He made this statement, in part, on the basis of March 5, 1998, letter to him signed by Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater and Attorney General Janet Reno. In relevant part, this letter (which Senator Domenici inserted into the record) read as follows: The 10 percent figure contained in the statute is not a mandatory set aside or rigid quota. First, the statute explicitly provides that the Secretary of Transportation may waive the goal for any reason...Second, in no way is the 10 percent figure imposed on any state or locality...Moreover, state agencies are permitted to waive goals when achievement on a particular contract or even for a specific year is not possible. The DBE program does not set aside a certain percentage of contracts or dollars for a specific set of contractors. Nor does the DBE program require recipients to use set-asides. The DBE program is a goals program which encourages participation without imposing rigid requirements of any type. Neither the Department's current nor proposed regulations permit the use of quotas. The DBE program does not use any rigid numerical requirements that would mandate a fixed number of dollars or contracts for DBEs. (S1427). The debate in the House proceeded in similar terms. Opponents of the DBE program, such as Representative Roukema (H2000), Representative Cox (H2004) and Speaker Gingrich (H2009) said the legislation constituted a quota, while proponents, such as Representatives Tauscher (H2001), Poshard (H2003), Bonior (H2004) and Menendez (H2004) said the program did not involve quotas or set-asides. DOT Response The DOT DBE program is not a quota or set-aside program, and it is not intended to operate as one. To make this point unmistakably clear, the Department has added explicitly worded new or amended provisions to the rule. Section 26.41 makes clear that the 10 percent statutory goal contained in ISTEA and TEA-21 is an aspirational goal at the national level. It does not set any funds aside for any person or group. It does not require any recipient or contractor to have 10 percent (or any other percentage) DBE goals or participation. Unlike former part 23, it does not require recipients to take any special administrative steps (e.g., providing a special justification to DOT) if their annual overall goal is less than 10 percent. Recipients must set goals consistent with their own circumstances (see §26.45). There is no direct link between the national 10 percent aspirational goal and the way a recipient operates its program. The Department will use the 10 percent goal as a means of evaluating the overall performance of the DBE program nationwide. For example, if nationwide DBE participation were to drop precipitously, the Department would reevaluate its efforts to ensure nondiscriminatory access to DOT-assisted contracting opportunities. Section 26.43 states flatly that recipients are prohibited from using quotas under any circumstances. The section also prohibits set-asides except in the most extreme circumstances where no other approach could be expected to redress egregious discrimination. Section 26.45 makes clear that in setting overall goals, recipients aspire to achieving only the amount of DBE participation that would be obtained in a nondiscriminatory market. Recipients are not to simply pick a number representing a policy objective or responding to any particular constituency. Section 26.53 also outlines what bidders must do to be responsive and responsible on DOT-assisted contracts having contract goals. They must make good faith efforts to meet these goals. Bidders can meet this requirement either by having enough DBE participation to meet the goal or by documenting good faith efforts, even if those efforts did not actually achieve the goal. These means of meeting contract goal requirements are fully equivalent. Recipients are prohibited from denying a contract to a bidder simply because it did not obtain enough DBE participation to meet the goal. Recipients must seriously consider bidders' documentation of good faith efforts. To make certain that bidders' showings are taken seriously, the rule requires recipients to offer administrative reconsideration to bidders whose good faith efforts showings are initially rejected. These provisions leave no room for doubt: there is no place for quotas in the DOT DBE program. In the Department's oversight, we will take care to ensure that recipients implement the program consistent with the intent of Congress and these regulatory prohibitions. 2. Sanctions for recipients who fail to meet overall goals. SNPRM Comments The issue of sanctions for recipients who fail to meet overall goals was not a subject of comments on the SNPRM. Since the Department has never imposed such sanctions, this absence of comment is not surprising. Congressional Debate DBE program opponents asserted, in connection with their argument that the DBE program is a quota program, that the Department could impose sanctions for failure to meet goals. "The goals have requirements and the real threat of sanctions," Senator McConnell said. (S1488). Citing a provision of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) manual saying that if "a state has violated or failed to comply with Federal laws or...regulations," FHWA could withhold Federal funding, Senator McConnell said, In other words, there are sanctions. The same threats appear in...the Federal transportation regulations...When the Federal government is wielding that kind of weapon from on high, it does not have to punish them. A 10 percent quota is still a quota, even if the States always comply and no one is formally punished. (Id.) Defenders of the DBE program pointed out that the Department had never punished a recipient for failing to meet an overall goal (e.g., Rep. Tauscher, H2001; Senator Boxer, S1433). Senator Domenici asked Secretary Slater and Attorney General Reno whether there are sanctions, penalties, or fines that may be (or ever have been) imposed on a recipient who does not meet DBE program goals. He entered the following reply in the record: No state has ever been sanctioned by DOT for not meeting its goals. Nothing in the statute or regulations imposes sanctions on any state recipient that has attempted in good faith, but failed, to meet its self-imposed goals. (S1427). Senator Lieberman added that if states fail to meet their own goals, "there is no Federal sanction or enforcement mechanism." (S1493). DOT Response The Department has never sanctioned a recipient for failing to meet an overall goal. We do not intend to do so. To eliminate any confusion, we have added a new provision (§26.47) that explicitly states that a recipient cannot be penalized, or treated by the Department as being in noncompliance with the rule, simply because its DBE participation falls short of its overall goal. For example, if a recipient's overall goal is 12 percent, and its participation is 8 percent, the Department cannot and will not penalize the recipient simply because its actual DBE participation rate was less than its goal. Overall goals are not quotas, and the Department does not sanction recipients because their participation levels fall short of their overall goals. Of course, if a recipient does not have a DBE program, does not set a DBE goal, does not implement its DBE program in good faith, or discriminates in the way it operates its program, it can be found in noncompliance. But its noncompliance would never be having failed to "make a number." 3. Economic Disadvantage. SNPRM Comments Some commenters favored eliminating the presumption of economic disadvantage, saying that applicants should have to prove their economic disadvantage. Other commenters favored obtaining additional financial information from applicants so that, even if the presumption remained in force, recipients would have a better idea of whether applicants really were disadvantaged. The question of the standard for determining disadvantage generated substantial comment, with some commenters favoring, and others objecting to, the proposed use of a personal net worth standard to assist recipients in determining whether an applicant was economically disadvantaged. There was also disagreement among commenters concerning the level at which such a standard should be set (e.g., $750,000, or something higher or lower). These comments, and the Department's response to them, are further discussed in the section-by-section analysis for §26.67. Congressional Debate The Congress debated the topic of who is regarded as economically disadvantaged under the statute. DBE opponents, including Senators Ashcroft (S1405) and McConnell (S1418) and Representative Cox (H2004), asserted that outrageously rich people could be eligible to participate as DBEs, frequently using the Sultan of Brunei as an example. The basic thrust of their argument was that if the program does not exclude wealthy members of the designated groups - meaning those who are not, in fact, disadvantaged - then it is "overinclusive" and therefore not narrowly tailored. Senator McConnell added that, because the Department's SNPRM did not include a specific dollar amount for a cap on personal net worth, it would not be effective. (S1486). On the other hand, DBE program supporters cited the SNPRM's proposed net worth cap as an effective device to stop wealthy people from participating in the program. These included Minority Leader Daschle (with a reference to a letter from the Associate Attorney General, S1413), Senator Baucus (S1414, S1423), Senator Lieberman (S1493), Senator Boxer (S1433), and Senator Moseley-Braun, who responded to the Sultan of Brunei example by noting that the program was directed primarily at U.S. citizens (S1420). DOT Response The final rule (§26.67) specifically imposes a personal net worth cap of $750,000. This means that, regardless of race, gender or the size of their business, any individual whose personal net worth exceeds $750,000 is not considered economically disadvantaged and is not eligible for the DBE program. The provision also makes it much easier for recipients to determine whether an individual's net worth exceeds the cap. Applicants will have to submit a statement of personal net worth and supporting documentation to the recipient with their applications. If the information shows net worth above the cap, the recipient would rebut the presumption based on the information in the application itself and the individual would not be eligible for the program. In such a case, it would not be necessary for a third party to challenge the economic disadvantage of an applicant in order to rebut the presumption. While there have been very few documented cases of wealthy individuals seeking to take advantage of the Department's program, the revised provisions of part 26 virtually eliminate even the possibility of this type of abuse. 4. Social Disadvantage SNPRM Comments A few commenters suggested that the presumption of social disadvantage, as well as that of economic disadvantage, be eliminated, so that applicants would have to demonstrate both elements of disadvantage. Any presumption of disadvantage tied to a racial classification, in the view of some of these commenters, undermined the constitutionality of the program. Other commenters noted that persons who are not members of the presumptively disadvantaged groups can be eligible and, in some cases, suggested that the criteria for evaluating such applications be clarified. Congressional Debate The presumption of social disadvantage drew fire from DBE program opponents because it was allegedly overinclusive. For example, Senator McConnell produced a map illustrating the over 100 countries of origin leading to inclusion in one of the presumed socially disadvantaged groups, pointing out that people from some countries (e.g., Pakistan) are presumed to be socially disadvantaged while those from other countries (e.g., Poland) are not. (S1418). Senator McConnell said that there was no basis for selecting this definition over any other. (Id.) Senator Hatch also listed the countries from which Asian-Pacific Americans and Subcontinent Asian-Americans can originate, suggesting that it was inappropriate to create "all kinds of special interest groups who are vying for these programs." (S1411). DBE proponents responded that discrimination against minorities and women in general, and against specific minorities in particular (e.g., African Americans) was very real and formed a basis for the presumption of social disadvantage (see discussion below concerning the existence of discrimination). Senator Baucus also noted that this presumption could be overcome. (S1402). Opponents also charged that the presumption of social disadvantage was underinclusive; that is, "you underinclude people who have a right to be included in the bid process." (Senator McConnell, S1399). The people who are not included who have a right to be, in the view of opponents, are white males (e.g., Senator Sessions' reference to testimony from Adarand Constructors' owner, S1400). Senator Kennedy disagreed with this assertion, saying Of course, this program doesn't just help women and minorities. It extends a helping hand to firms owned by white males, as well. They can be certified to [participate] if they prove that they have been disadvantaged. Just ask Randy Pech - owner of the Adarand Construction Firm - because he is currently seeking certification. (S1482). Senator Domenici was interested in the same question, and entered into the record the following response from Secretary Slater and Attorney General Reno: Any individual owning a business may demonstrate that he is socially and economically disadvantaged, even if that individual is not a woman or a minority. Both the current and proposed regulations provide detailed guidance to recipients to assist them in making individual determinations of disadvantaged status. And, in fact, businesses owned by white males have qualified for DBE status. (S1427). DOT Response By having passed the DBE statutory provision, after lengthy and specific debate, Congress has once again determined that members of the designated groups should be presumed socially disadvantaged. All of these groups are specifically incorporated by reference in the legislation that Congress debated and approved. This presumption (i.e., a determination that it is not necessary for group members to prove individually that they have been the subject of discrimination or disadvantage) is based on the understanding of Members of Congress about the discrimination that members of these groups have faced. The presumption is rebuttable in the DOT program. If a recipient or third party determines that there is a reasonable basis for concluding that an individual from one of the designated groups is not socially disadvantaged, it can pursue a proceeding under §26.87 to remove the presumption. Likewise, a white male, or anyone else who is not presumed to be disadvantaged, can make an individual showing of social and economic disadvantage and participate in the program on the same basis as any other disadvantaged individual (see §26.67). 5. The "Low-Bid System." SNPRM Comments Non-DBE contractors expressed concern that a variety of provisions under the program and the SNPRM adversely affected the low-bid system, including contract goals, evaluation credits, and good faith efforts guidance concerning prime contractors' handling of subcontractor prices and consideration of other bidders' success in meeting goals. Congressional Debate Opponents of the DBE program assert that the program results in white male contractors not receiving contracts they would otherwise expect to receive. Senator Sessions cited the statement of the Adarand company to this effect. (S1400). Senator Ashcroft said that "if two bids come in from two subcontractors, one owned by a white male and the other by a racial minority, and the bids are the same, or even close, the job will go to the minority-owned company, not the low bidder." (S1405). Senator Gorton inserted into the record letters from a Spokane subcontractor asserting that, in a number of cases, it had lost subcontracts to DBE firms despite having a lower quote. (S1415-16). Representative Roukema also cited examples of firms who made similar assertions. (H2000). In contrast, DBE program proponents argued that the program was about leveling the playing field for DBEs. Senator Moseley-Braun cited letters from her constituents for the point that ...the DBE program is not about taking away contracts from qualified male-owned businesses and handing them over to unqualified female-owned firms. The program is not about denying contracts to Caucasian low bidders in favor of higher bids that happen to have been submitted by Hispanics or African Americans or Asians or women. (S1420). Without such a program, her constituents' letters said, they would lose the chance to compete. (Id.). Citing testimony from a Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Kennedy noted that it was the experience of some DBEs that white male prime contractors had accepted higher bids from other firms to avoid working with DBEs. (S1430). Why would a general contractor accept a higher bid? It doesn't make sense unless you remember that the traditional business network doesn't include women or minorities. . . [A woman business owner testified] that some general contractors would rather lose money than deal with female contractors. (Id.) DOT Response For the most part, statutory low-bid requirements exist only at the prime contracting level. That is, state and local governments, in awarding prime contracts, must select the low bidder in many procurements (there may be exceptions in some types of purchases). Nothing in this regulation requires, under any circumstances, a recipient to accept a higher bid for a prime contract from a DBE when a non-DBE has presented a lower bid. This rule does not interfere with recipients' implementation of state and local low-bid legislation. The selection of subcontractors by a prime contractor is typically not subject to any low-bid requirements under state or local law. Prime contractors have unfettered discretion to select any subcontractor they wish. Price is clearly a key factor, but nothing legally compels a prime contractor to hire the subcontractor who makes the lowest quote. Other factors, such as the prime contractor's familiarity and experience with a subcontractor, the quality of a subcontractor's work, the word-of-mouth reputation of the subcontractor in the prime contracting community, or the prime's comfort or discomfort with dealing with a particular subcontractor can be as or more important than price in some situations. It is in this context that §26.53 requires that prime contractors make good faith efforts to achieve DBE contract goals. The rule does not require that recipients ignore price or quality, let alone obtain a certain amount of DBE participation without regard to other considerations. The good faith efforts requirements are intended to ensure that prime contractors cannot simply refuse to consider qualified, competitive DBE subcontractors. At the same time, the good faith efforts waiver of contract goals serves as a safeguard to ensure that prime contractors will not be forced into accepting an unreasonable or excessive quote from a DBE subcontractor. 6. Constitutionality. SNPRM Comments Non-DBE contractors and their groups argued that the SNPRM proposals, particularly with respect to overall goals and the use of race-conscious measures, failed to meet the Adarand narrow tailoring test. Many of these commenters said that the overall goals were suspect because they did not adequately consider the capacity of DBEs to perform contracts and Adarand requires that race-conscious measures may be used only after a recipient has demonstrated that race-neutral means have failed. The use of presumptions based on racial classifications was viewed as intrinsically unconstitutional by these commenters, many of whom cited the language of Judge Kane's decision in the Adarand remand to this effect. Some commenters also contended that, absent recipient-specific findings of compelling need, the program could not be constitutional. They said that existing information alleging compelling interest - such as various disparity studies or information compiled by the Department of Justice - was inadequate to meet the compelling interest test. DBEs and recipients who commented defended the constitutionality of the program, often citing experience with discrimination in the marketplace and contending that the SNPRM succeeded in narrowly tailoring the program. Congressional Debate Proponents and opponents of the DBE program extensively debated the constitutionality of the DBE statutory provision and the entire DBE program. Generally, opponents argued that the Supreme Court and District Court decisions in Adarand rendered the program unconstitutional, while proponents said that the decisions did not have that effect. Proponents and opponents of the DBE program agreed that the Supreme Court's Adarand decision established a two-part test for the constitutionality of a program that uses a racial classification. The program must be based on a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest (e.g., Senator McConnell, S1396; Senator Baucus, S1403). Opponents relied on the finding of a Colorado district court on remand that the program was not narrowly tailored and was thus unconstitutional (Senator McConnell, S 1396; Senator Ashcroft, S1405). Proponents replied that the remand decision represented the views of only one district court (Senator Baucus, S1403), that it failed to properly apply the reasoning of the Supreme Court decision with respect to narrow tailoring (Senator Domenici, S1425), and that the Department's forthcoming regulations would ensure that the program was narrowly tailored (see discussion below). A. Compelling interest (1) Existence of Discrimination Proponents (and some opponents) of the DBE provision said that discrimination and/or disadvantage with respect to minorities and/or women persists. In the House, these included Representative Roukema (H2000-01), Representative Norton (H2003), Representative Poshard (H2003), Representative Menendez (H2004), Representative Davis of Illinois (H2005), Representative Boswell (H2005), Representative Lampson (H2006), Representative Kennedy (H2006), Representative Jackson-Lee (H2006), Representative Edwards (H2007), Representative Andrews (H2007), Representative Rodriguez (H2008), Representative Towns (H2010), Representative Dixon (H2010), and Representative Millender-McDonald (H2011). DBE opponents typically remained silent on this point, neither affirming nor denying the existence of discrimination against women and minorities. There was a similar pattern in the Senate debates. Opponents typically did not address the present existence of discrimination or disadvantage with respect to minorities and women or its continuing effects, spoke of such discrimination as something that existed in the past (Senator Sessions, S1399; Senator Hatch, S1411), or asserted that race-based disadvantage or discrimination no longer exists (Senator Ashcroft, S1406). The Senators who said that such discrimination persists included Senator Baucus (S1403, S1413, S1496), Senator Warner (S1403), Senator Kerry (S1408), Senator Wellstone (S1410), Senator Moseley-Braun (S1419-20), Senator Robb (S1422); Senator Brownback (S1423-24), Senator Domenici (S1425-26), Senator Kennedy (S1429-30, S1482), Senator Specter (S1485), Senator McCain (S1489), Senator Lautenberg (S1490), Senator Durbin (S1491), Senator Daschle (S1492), Senator Lieberman (S1493), Senator Bingaman (S1494), Senator Murray (S1495), and Senator Dorgan (S1495). (2) Evidence of discrimination or disadvantage In comments on the passage of the TEA-21 conference report in the Senate, Senator Chafee noted a Colorado Department of Transportation disparity study that found a disproportionately small number of women- and minority-owned contractors participating in that state's highway construction industry. More than 99 percent of contracts went to firms owned by white men. (Congressional Record, May 22, 1998; S5413). In the House discussion of the conference report, Representative Norton presented an extensive summary of relevant evidence of discrimination forming the basis for a compelling need for the DBE program. (H3957). Throughout the debate, the Members who affirmed the existence of discrimination and/or disadvantage asserted a number of factual bases for concluding that the DBE program was necessary. This information is largely drawn from the Senate debate; the briefer House debate contains less detail. Senator Baucus cited disparities between the earnings of women and men and between the percentage of small businesses women own and the percentage of Federal procurement dollars they receive. He also noted that minorities make up 20 percent of the population, own 9 percent of construction businesses, and get only 4 percent of construction receipts. (S1403). Finally, Senator Baucus, via a letter from the Associate Attorney General, cited to numerous Congressional findings concerning the effects of discrimination in the construction industry and in DOT-assisted programs. (S1413). Senator Kerry added that women own 9.2 percent of the nation's construction firms but their companies earn only about half of what is earned by male-owned firms. (S1409). Senator Robb commented that the evidence of racially based disadvantage is "compelling and disturbing." He continued, stating that, "White-owned construction firms receive 50 times as many loan dollars as African-American owned firms that have identical equity." (S1422). Senator Kennedy said that the playing field for women and minorities and other victims of discrimination was still not level. Job discrimination against minorities and the "glass ceiling" for women still persisted, he said, adding that "Nowhere is the deck stacked more heavily against women and minorities than in the construction industry." (S1429). He cited a number of instances in which minority or female contractors encountered overt discrimination in trying to get work. (S1429-30). Senator Lautenberg said that, for transportation-related contracts, minority-owned firms get only 61 cents for every dollar of work that white male-owned businesses receive. The comparable figure for women-owned firms was 48 cents. He also mentioned that "women-owned businesses have a lower rate of loan delinquency, yet still have far greater difficulty in obtaining loans." (S1490). He then spoke of the continuing effects of past discrimination: Jim Crow laws were wiped off the books over 30 years ago. However, their pernicious effects on the construction industry remain. Transportation construction has historically relied on the old boy network which, until the last decade, was almost exclusively a white, old boy network....This is an industry that relies heavily on business friendships and relationships established decades, sometimes generations, ago - years before minority-owned firms were even allowed to compete. (Id.) Senator Durbin referred to recent studies concerning job bias against minorities and women. (S1491). Senator Lieberman referred generally to previous Congressional committee findings and testimony concerning still-existing barriers to full participation for minorities and women. (S1493). He also cited the May 1996 Department of Justice survey of discrimination and its effects in business and contracting. He referred to a recent study in Denver showing that African Americans were 3 times, and Hispanics 1.5 times, more likely than whites to be rejected for business loans. Senator Daschle summed up by saying, "[t]here is clearly a compelling interest in addressing the pervasive discrimination that has characterized the highway construction industry." (S1492). Throughout the portion of the debate described above, many of the Members stressed that goal-based programs like the DBE program were the only effective way to combat the continuing effects of discrimination. Senator Baucus cited the experience of Michigan, in which DBE participation in the state-funded portion of the highway program fell to zero in a nine-month period after the state terminated its DBE program, while the Federal DBE program in Michigan was able to maintain 12.7 percent participation. (S1404). Senator Kerry also raised the Michigan example, and went on to cite similar sharp decreases in DBE participation when Louisiana, Hillsborough County, Florida, and San Jose, California, eliminated affirmative action programs covering state- and locally-funded programs. Senator Kerry asked rhetorically: ...is that just the economy of our country speaking, an economy at one moment that is capable of having 12 percent and at another moment, where they lose the incentive to do so, to drop down to zero, to drop down by 99 percent, to drop down by 80 percent, to have .4 at the State level while at the Federal level there are 12 percent? You could not have a more compelling interest if you tried.... (S1409-10). Senator Moseley-Braun added the examples of Arizona, Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Delaware to the jurisdictions cited by other members where state-funded projects without a DBE program have significantly less DBE participation than Federally funded projects subject to the DBE program. She added, "Where there are no DBE programs, women- and minority-owned small businesses are shut out of highway construction." (S1420-21). Senator Kennedy added Nebraska, Missouri, Tampa and Philadelphia to the list of jurisdictions that experienced precipitous drops in DBE participation after goals programs ended. (S1429-30; S1482). He also cited comments from DBE companies that goal programs were needed to surmount discrimination-related barriers. (S1482). Senator Domenici repeated many of the same points as previous DBE proponents concerning the basis for concluding that the program was needed (S1426), as did Senator Kempthorne. (S1494). Senator Robb emphasized that the DBE program was essential to combating discrimination and ensuring economic opportunity, explicitly linking the fall-off in DBE participation to continuing discrimination: Where DBE programs at the State level have been eliminated, participation by qualified women and qualified minorities in government transportation contracts has plummeted. There is no way to know whether this discrimination is intentional or subconscious, but the effect is the same. This experience demonstrates the sad but inescapable truth that, when it comes to providing economic opportunities to women and minorities, passivity equals inequality. (S1422). 3. Narrow tailoring DBE proponents cited the Department's proposed DBE rule as the vehicle that would ensure that the DBE program would be narrowly tailored. They cited features of the SNPRM including a new mechanism for calculation of overall goals, giving priority to race-neutral measures in meeting goals, a greater emphasis on good faith efforts, DBE diversification, added flexibility for recipients, net worth provisions, ability to challenge presumptions of social and economic disadvantage, and flexibility in goal-setting. In comments on the Senate consideration of the TEA-21 conference report, Senator Baucus concluded by saying: As I explained in my statements during the debate on the McConnell amendment...the program is narrowly tailored, both under the current and the new regulations, which emphasize flexible goals tied to the capacity of firms in the local market, the use of race-neutral measures, and the appropriate use of waivers for good faith efforts. (Congressional Record, May 22, 1998; S5414). Following Senator Baucus' remarks, Senator Chafee, Chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, requested that he be associated with Senator Baucus' remarks on constitutionality. (S5414). DBE opponents denied that regulatory change could result in a narrowly tailored program. Senator Smith said "The administration's attempt to comply with the Court's decision by fiddling around with the DOT regulations does not meet the constitutional litmus test." (S1398). The most frequent argument against the efficacy of regulatory change was that a racial classification is inherently unable to be narrowly tailored. (Senator Sessions, S1399-1400; Senator Ashcroft, S1407). DOT Response The 1998 debate over DBE legislation was the most thorough in which Congress has engaged since the beginning of the program. The record of this debate clearly supports the Department's view that there is a compelling governmental interest in remedying discrimination and its effects in DOT-assisted contracting. Congress clearly determined that real, pervasive, and injurious discrimination exists. Congress backed up that determination with reference to a wide range of factual material, including private and public contracting, DOT-assisted and state- and locally-funded programs and the financing of the contracting industry. By retaining the DBE statutory provisions against this factual background, Congress clearly found that there was a compelling governmental interest in having the program. The courts, including the court in the Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Peña, 965 F.Supp. 1556 (D.Colo., 1997) and the court in In re: Sherbrooke Sodding, 6-96-CV-41 (D.Minn. 1998), agree that Congress has the power to legislate on a nationwide basis to address nationwide problems. Congress has a unique role as the national legislature to look at the whole of the United States for the basis to find a compelling governmental interest supporting the use of race-based remedies. Congress is not required to make particularized findings of discrimination in individual localities to which a nationwide program may apply. Nor is Congress required to find that the Federal government itself has discriminated before applying a race-conscious remedy. (Id. at 1573). Having reviewed the extensive evidence of discrimination and its relationship to DOT-assisted contracting, the District Court in Adarand determined that current and previous DBE provisions were a "considered response by Congress to the effects of discrimination on the ability of minorities to participate in the mainstream of federal contracting." (Id. at 1576). The court stated that "Congress has a strong basis in evidence for enacting the challenged statutes, which thus serve a 'compelling governmental interest.'" (Id. at 1577). The extensive Congressional debate and information supporting the enactment of the 1998 DBE provision significantly strengthens the existing basis for declaring that this program serves a compelling governmental interest. The basis for District Court's view that the program at issue in Adarand is unconstitutional is stated most clearly in the following passage: Contrary to the [Supreme] Court's pronouncement that strict scrutiny is not 'fatal in fact,' I find it difficult to envisage a race-based classification that is narrowly tailored. By its very nature, such [a] program is both underinclusive and overinclusive. (Id. at 1580). By underinclusive, the court said it meant that caucasians and members of non-designated minority groups are excluded. By overinclusive, it said it meant that all the members of the designated groups are presumed to be economically and/or socially disadvantaged, without Congress having inquired whether a particular entity seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past discrimination (citing the Supreme Court's Croson decision, which concerned the powers of state and local governments to use race-based remedies). (Id.) As Senator Domenici pointed out (S1425), the key words in the District Court's opinion are "Contrary to the [Supreme] Court's pronouncement...." The District Court's analysis departs markedly from the controlling decision of the Supreme Court on this issue (Adarand v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)). The Supreme Court's language with which the District Court disagreed is the following: Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." [citation omitted] The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it...When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases. (515 U.S. at 237). The Supreme Court evidently considers the "not fatal in fact" language to have continuing vitality, having cited it in a subsequent case (U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, note 6 (1996)). Under the District Court's analysis, Congress could never use a race-based classification, no matter how compelling the need, because any such classification would intrinsically fail to be narrowly tailored. This approach effectively moots the determination of whether there is a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court's approach, by contrast, permits a racial classification to be used, given the existence of a compelling interest, if it is narrowly tailored. What is the test for narrow tailoring? As set forth in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987), the test includes several factors: "the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties." In Adarand, the Supreme Court specifically invited inquiry into whether there was any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation (related to the efficacy of alternative remedies) and whether the program was appropriately limited so that it will not last longer than the discrimination it is designed to eliminate (related to the duration of relief). (515 U.S. at 238). This final rule successfully addresses each element of this test: • The necessity of relief. Throughout the debate on the compelling governmental interest, the bipartisan majority of both houses of Congress repeatedly described the necessity of the DBE program's goal-based approach to remedying the effects of discrimination in DOT-assisted contracting. The most significant evidence demonstrating the necessity of a goal-oriented program is the evidence cited of the fall-off in DBE participation in state contracting when goal-oriented programs end, compared to participation rates in the Federal DBE program. • Efficacy of alternative remedies. This element of the narrow tailoring standard is related to the Supreme Court's inquiry concerning race-neutral programs. Under §26.51 of this rule, recipients are required to meet the maximum feasible portion of their overall goals by using race-neutral measures. Recipients are not required to have contract goals on each contract. Instead, they are instructed to use contract goals only for any portion of their overall goal they cannot meet through race-neutral measures. Contract goals are intended as a safety net to be used when race-neutral means are not effective to ensure that a recipient can achieve "level playing field." Moreover, the regulations provide that recipients must reduce the use of contract goals when other means are sufficient to meet their overall goals. This ensures that race-conscious relief is used only to the extent necessary and is replaced by race-neutral as quickly as possible. • Flexibility of relief. Flexibility is built into the program in a variety of ways. Recipients set their own goals, based on local market conditions; their goals are not imposed by the federal government nor do recipients have to tie them to any uniform national percentage. (§26.45). Recipients also choose their own method for goal setting and can choose to base the goal on the evidence that they believe best reflects their market conditions. (§26.45). Recipients have broad discretion to choose whether or not to use a goal on any given contract, and if they do choose to use a contract goal, they are free to set it at any level they believe is appropriate for the type and location of the specific work involved. (§26.51). The rule also ensures flexibility for contractors by requiring that any contract goal be waived entirely for a prime contractor that demonstrates that it made good faith efforts but was still unable to meet the goal. (§26.53). The rule also allows recipients that believe they can achieve equal opportunity for DBEs through different approaches to get waivers releasing them from almost any of the specific requirements of the rule. (§26.103). Recipients can also get exemptions from the rule if they have unique circumstances that make complying with the rule impractical. (§26.103). • Duration of relief. The TEA-21 DBE program will end in 2004 unless reauthorized by the Congress. In each successive reauthorization bill for the surface transportation and airport programs, Congress will have the opportunity to examine the current state of transportation contracting and determine whether the DBE program statutes are still necessary to remedy the continuing effects of discrimination. In addition, the duration of relief for individuals and firms are limited by the personal net worth threshold and business size caps. When an individual's personal wealth grows beyond the threshold, he or she will lose the presumption of disadvantage. (§26.67). Similarly, when a firm's receipts grows beyond the small business size standards, it loses its eligibility to participate in the program. (§26.65). Finally, to ensure that race-conscious remedies are not used any longer than absolutely necessary, §26.51 requires recipients to reduce the use of contract goals and rely on race-neutral measures to the extent that they are effective. • Relationship of goals to the relevant market. The overall goal setting provisions of §26.45 require that recipient set overall goals based on demonstrable evidence of the relative availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in the areas from which each recipient obtains contractors. These provisions ensure that there is as close a fit as possible between the goals set by each recipient and the realities of its relevant market. When a recipient sets contract goals, §26.51 provides that these goals are to be set realistically in relation to the availability of DBEs for the type and location of work involved. • Impact of relief on the rights of third parties. The legitimate interests of third parties (e.g., prime contractors, non-DBE subcontractors) are only minimally impacted by the DBE program, since the program is aimed at replicating a market in which there are no effects of discrimination and the program affects only a relatively small percentage of total federal-aid funds. The design of the overall and contract goal provisions ensures that the use of race-conscious remedies having the potential to affect the interests of third parties is limited to the extent necessary to counter the effects of discrimination. Individual prime contractors are further protected from suffering any undue burdens by §26.51, which prevents a prime contractor from losing a contract if it made good faith efforts but was still unable to meet a goal. Non-DBE firms are also protected by §26.33, which directs recipients to take appropriate steps to address areas of overconcentration of DBE firms in certain types of work that could unduly burden non-DBE firms seeking the same type of work. • Inclusion of appropriate beneficiaries. The certification provisions of Subparts D and E, and particularly the social and economic disadvantage provisions of §26.67, ensure that only firms owned and controlled by individuals who are in fact socially and economically disadvantaged can participate in the program. Eligibility provisions guard against overinclusiveness by ensuring that individuals with too great net worth are not presumed disadvantaged and by permitting the recipient - on its own initiative or as the result of a complaint - to follow procedures to rebut the presumption of social and/or economic disadvantage. They guard against underinclusiveness by permitting any business owner, including a white male, to demonstrate social and economic disadvantage on an individual basis. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS §26.1 - What are the objectives of this part? There were relatively few comments on this section of the SNPRM, most of which agreed with the proposed language. We have adopted the suggestion of some commenters that specific reference be made to the role of the DBE program in helping DBEs overcome barriers (e.g., access to capital and bonding) to equal participation. We have also added a specific reference to the role of the program in creating a level playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly for DOT-assisted contracts. Some non-DBE contractors urged that language be added to explicitly oppose "reverse discrimination." The rule clearly states that nondiscrimination is the program's first objective and the Department reiterates here that it opposes unlawful discrimination of any kind. §26.3 To whom does this part apply? This provision is unchanged from the SNPRM, except for references to the new TEA-21 statutory provisions. A few commenters wanted this provision to apply to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs, as did the original version of former part 23. However, FRA does not have specific statutory authority for a DBE program parallel to the TEA-21 language. One commenter asked if the language saying that DBE requirements do not apply to contracts without any DOT funding is inconsistent with Federal Transit Administration (FTA) guidance on applicability. While the structure of the FTA program is such that FTA funds are commingled with local funds in many transit authority contracts (e.g., any contract involving FTA operating assistance funds), to which DBE requirements would apply, a contract which is funded entirely with local funds -- and without any Federal funds -- would not be subject to requirements under this rule. §26.5 What do the terms used in this part mean? There were relatively few comments on the definitions proposed in the SNPRM. One commenter wanted to substitute the term "historically underutilized business" for DBE. Given the continued use of the DBE term in Congressional consideration of the program, the continued use of the "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" language in the statute, and the familiarity of concerned parties with the DBE term, we do not believe changing the term would be a good idea. A few commenters asked for additional definitions or elaboration of existing definitions (e.g., "form of arrangement," "financial assistance program," "commercially useful function"). These terms are either already defined sufficiently or are best understood in context of the operational sections in which they are embedded, and abstract definitions in this section would not add much to anyone's ability to make the program work well. Consequently, we are not adding them. Otherwise the final rule adopts the SNPRM proposals for definitions with only minor editorial changes. The Department has added, for the sake of clarity and consistency with other Federal programs, definitions of the terms Alaskan native, Alaskan native corporation (ANC), Indian tribe, immediate family member, Native Hawaiian, Native Hawaiian organization, principal place of business, primary industry classification, and tribally-owned concern. These definitions are taken from the SBA's new small disadvantaged business program regulation (13 CFR §124.3). The definitions of the designated groups included in the definition of "socially and economically disadvantaged individual" also derive from the SBA regulations, as the Department's DBE statutes require. We believe these will be useful terms of art in implementing the DBE program. A few commenters requested definitions for the terms "race-conscious" and "race-neutral," and we have provided definitions. A race-conscious program is one that focuses on, and provides benefits only for, DBEs. The use of contract goals is the primary example of a race-conscious measure in the DBE program. A race-neutral program is one that, while benefiting DBEs, is not solely focused on DBE firms. For example, small business outreach programs, technical assistance programs, and prompt payment clauses can assist a wide variety of small businesses, not just DBEs. §26.7 What discriminatory actions are forbidden? One commenter wanted to add prohibitions of discrimination based on age, disability and religion. The Department is not doing so, because discrimination on these grounds is already prohibited by other statutes (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act with respect to disability). Also, statutes which form the basis for this rule focus on race, color, national origin, and sex. Congress determined that remedial action focused on these areas is necessary. These grounds for discrimination are also most relevant to problems in the DBE program that have been alleged to exist (e.g., disparate treatment of DBE certification applicants by race or sex). Some opponents of the program said that the DBE program discriminates against non-DBEs. However, the Department believes that the program is constitutional and does not violate equal protection requirements. A reference to DOT Title VI regulations has been deleted as unnecessary; otherwise, this provision is the same as in the SNPRM. §26.9 How does the Department issue guidance and interpretations under this part? Commenters, most of whom were recipients, focused on two issues in this section. First, a majority of the comments favored the "coordination mechanism" concept for ensuring consistent DOT guidance and interpretations. The few that disagreed with this approach did so out of a concern that the mechanism would add delays to the process. These commenters favored additional training or an 800 number hot line to speed up the process. We believe that proper coordination of interpretations and guidance is vital to the successful implementation of this rule. As the preambles to the 1992 and 1997 proposed rules mentioned, inconsistent implementation of part 23 has been a continuing problem, which has been criticized by a General Accounting Office report and which has created unnecessary difficulty for recipients, contractors, and the Department itself. A process for ensuring that the Department speaks with one voice on DBE implementation matters, and for letting the public know when DOT has spoken, will greatly improve the service we give our customers. We do not believe this coordination process will result in significant delays in providing guidance. Nor will it inhibit the ability of DOT staff and customers to communicate with one another. For example, the process does not apply to informal advice provided by staff to recipients or contractors over the phone or in a letter or e-mail. It does maintain, however, the important distinction between informal staff assistance on one hand and a binding institutional position on the other. For clarity in the process, we have modified the language of the rule text to make clear that interpretations and guidance are binding, official Departmental positions if the Secretary signs them or if the document includes a statement that they have been reviewed and approved by the General Counsel. The General Counsel will consult fully with all concerned offices as part of this review process. We intend to post significant guidance documents and interpretations on the Department's web site to make them widely and quickly available. As some commenters suggested, we are also continuing to consider forming an advisory committee (or working group of an existing committee) to facilitate customer input into DBE program matters. This is separate from the coordination mechanism, however, which is an internal DOT process. The rule's provisions regarding exemptions and waivers, previously found in the SNPRM's §26.9(c) and (d), are now included as a separate section at §26.15. §26.11 What records do recipients keep and report? The Department asked, in the SNPRM, whether it would be advisable to have one standard reporting form for information about the DBE program. Currently, each operating administration (OA) has its own reporting form and requirements. Virtually all the commenters that addressed this issue favored a single, DOT-wide reporting form. Commenters also had a wide variety of suggestions for what data should be reported, formats, and retention periods. The Department is adopting the suggestion of having a single reporting form, which we believe will reduce administrative burdens for recipients, particularly those who receive funds from more than one OA. Because we do not want to delay the issuance of this rule while a form is being developed, we are reserving the date on which this single form requirement will go into effect. We will take comments on the specifics of reporting into account and consult with interested parties as we devise the form, which will be published subsequently in Appendix B to this rule. The Appendix will also address the issues of reporting frequency and record retention periods. Meanwhile, recipients will continue to report as directed by the concerned OA(s), using existing reporting forms. The rule is also adding a requirement that recipients develop and maintain a "bidders" list. The bidders list is intended to be a count of all firms that are participating, or attempting to participate, on DOT-assisted contracts. The list must include all firms that bid on prime contracts or bid or quote subcontracts on DOT-assisted projects, including both DBEs and non-DBEs. Bidders lists appear to be a promising method for accurately determining the availability of DBE and non-DBE firms and the Department believes that developing bidders data will be useful for recipients. Creating and maintaining a bidders list will give recipients another valuable way to measure the relative availability of ready, willing and able DBEs when setting their overall goals. (See §26.45). We realize that identifying subcontractors, particularly non-DBEs and all subcontractors that were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain contracts, may well be a difficult task for many recipients. Mindful of that potential burden, the rule will not impose any procedural requirements for how the data is collected. Recipients are free to choose whether or not they wish to gather this data through their existing bidding and reporting processes. Recipients are encouraged to make use of all of the data already available to them and all methods of reporting and communication with their contracting community that they already have in place. In addition, the Department suggests that recipients consider using a widely publicized public notice or a widely disseminated survey to encourage all firms that have bid or quoted contracts to make themselves known to recipients. Once recipients have created the list of bidders, they will have to supplement that information with the age of each firm (since establishment) and the annual gross receipts of the firm (or an average of its annual gross receipts). Recipients can gather this additional information by sending a questionnaire to the firms on the list, or by any other means that the recipient believes will yield reliable information. The recipient's plan for how to create and maintain the list and gather the required information must be included in its DBE program. §26.13 What assurances must recipients and contractors make? There were few comments on this section. Most of these supported the proposal. One comment suggested specific mention of prompt payment, but in view of the substantive requirements on this subject, we do not believe such a mention is needed. Some commenters favored requiring additional public participation as part of the assurance for recipients. Again, given substantive provisions of this rule concerning public participation, we do not believe that repetition here is needed. One commenter said that incorporating the requirements of part 26 in the contract was confusing, since many provisions of part 26 apply only to recipients. We have rewritten the assurance for contractors in response to this concern, specifying that contractors are responsible only for carrying out the requirements of part 26 that apply to them. §26.15 How can recipients apply for exemptions or waivers? There has been some confusion as to this rule's distinction between exemption and waiver. Put simply, exemptions are for unique situations that are most likely not to be either generally applicable to all recipients or to have been contemplated in the rulemaking process. If such a situation occurs and it makes it impractical for a particular recipient to comply with a provision of part 26, the recipient should apply for an exemption from that provision. The waiver provision, by contrast, is not designed for extraordinary circumstances where a recipient may not be able to comply with part 26. Waiver is for a situation where a recipient believes that it can better accomplish the objectives of the DBE program through means other than the specific provisions of part 26. There were a number of comments about the proposed program waiver provision. Most commenters on this issue favored the proposal, believing it could add flexibility to the way recipients implement the DBE program. A few commenters were concerned that too liberal use of the waiver provision might undermine the goals of the rule. The Department believes that the waiver provision is an important aspect of the DBE program. The provision ensures that the Department and a recipient can work together to respond to any unique local circumstances. Recipients are encouraged to carefully review the circumstances in their own jurisdictions to determine what mechanisms are best suited to achieving compliance with the overall objectives of the DBE program. If a recipient believes it is appropriate to operate its program differently from the way that a provision of Subpart B or C provides, including, but not limited to, any provisions regarding administrative requirements, overall or contract goals, good faith efforts or counting provisions, it can apply for a waiver. For example, waiver requests could pertain to such subjects as the use of a race-conscious measure other than a contract goal, different ways of counting DBE participation in certain industries, use of separate overall or contract goals to address demonstrated discrimination against specific categories of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, the use or wording of assurances, differences in information collection requirements and methods, etc. The Department will, of course, carefully review any applications for waivers to make sure that innovative state or local programs are able to meet the objectives of the statutes and regulation. Decisions on waiver requests are made by the Secretary. This authority has not been delegated to other officials. The waiver provision, which the Department believes will help assist recipients to "narrowly tailor" the program to state and local circumstances and ensure nondiscrimination, remains in the final rule. §26.21 Who must have a DBE program? The only substantive comment concerning this provision asked that Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs be included. The Department is not including FRA programs under this rule because FRA does not have a specific DBE program statute parallel to those covering the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FTA, and FHWA. FRA could consider issuing a rule similar to part 26 under its own, separate statutory authority. The Department shortened paragraph (b)(1) to make it easier to understand. Within 180 days of the effective date of this rule, all recipients with existing programs must submit revised programs to the relevant OA for approval. The only changes from existing programs that recipients would have to make are changes needed to accommodate differences between former part 23 and part 26. Future new recipients would, of course, submit a DBE program as part of the approval process for financial assistance. §26.23 What is the requirement for a policy statement? §26.25 What is the requirement for a liaison officer? §26.27 What efforts must recipients make concerning DBE financial institutions? There were no substantive comments concerning §§26.23-26.27, and the Department is adopting them as proposed. §26.29 What prompt payment mechanisms must recipients have? There was substantial comment on the issue of prompt payment. A majority of commenters supported the concept of prompt payment provisions. Some recipients pointed out that they already had prompt payment provisions on the books. DBEs generally supported mandating prompt payment provisions though they, as well as other commenters, recognized that slow payment is a problem affecting many subcontractors, not just DBEs. Some of these comments suggested making prompt payment requirements applicable to subcontracts in general, not just DBE subcontracts. Some recipients were concerned about getting in the middle of disputes between prime contractors and subcontractors. Some commenters wanted the Department to mandate prompt payment provisions, while others preferred that their use by recipients remain optional. Having considered the variety of views expressed on this subject, the Department believes that prompt payment provisions are an important race-neutral mechanism that can benefit DBEs and all other small businesses. Under part 26, all recipients must include a provision in their contracts requiring prime contractors to make prompt payments to their subcontractors, DBE and non-DBE alike. It is clear that DBE subcontractors are significantly - and, to the extent that they tend to be smaller than non-DBEs, disproportionately - affected by late payments from prime contractors. Lack of prompt payment constitutes a very real barrier to the ability of DBEs to compete in the marketplace. It is appropriate for the Department to require recipients to take reasonable steps to deal with this barrier. We recognize that delayed payments do not affect only DBE contractors; a prompt payment requirement applying to all subcontracts is an excellent example of a race-neutral measure that will assist DBEs, and we are therefore requiring that recipients' prompt payment mechanisms apply to all subcontracts on Federally-assisted contracts. Paragraph (a) of this section requires recipients to put into their DBE programs a requirement for a prompt payment contract clause. This clause would appear in every prime contract on which there are subcontracting possibilities, and it would obligate the prime contractor to pay subcontractors within a given number of days from the receipt of each payment the recipient makes to the prime contractor. Payment is required only for satisfactory completion of the subcontractor's work. The clause would also apply to the return of retainage from the prime to the subcontractor. Retainage would have to be returned within a given number of days from the time the subcontractor's work had been satisfactorily completed, even if the prime contract had not yet been completed. A majority of commenters on the retainage issue favored a requirement of this kind. The number of days involved would be selected by the recipient, subject to OA approval as part of the recipient's DBE program. In approving these time frames, the OAs will consider whether they are realistic and sufficiently brief to ensure genuinely prompt payment. Recipients who already operate under prompt payment statutes may use their existing authority in implementing this requirement. It may be necessary to add to existing contract clauses in some cases (e.g., if existing prompt payment requirements do not cover retainage). Paragraph (b) lists a series of additional measures that the regulation authorizes, but does not require, recipients to use. These include alternative dispute resolution, holding of payments to primes until subcontractors are paid, and other mechanisms that the recipient may devise. All these mechanisms could be made part of the recipient's DBE programs. §26.31 What requirements pertain to the DBE directory? Recipients maintain directories listing certified DBEs. The issue most discussed by commenters on this section was whether the directory should include material concerning the qualifications of the firm to do various sorts of work. For example, has the firm been pre-qualified by the recipient? Can it do creditable work? What kinds of work does the firm prefer to do? Some commenters also asked that the directory should list the geographical areas in which the firm is willing to work. Other commenters opposed the idea of including this kind of information in the directory. The Department believes that the directory and the certification process are closely intertwined. The primary purpose of the directory is to show the results of the certification process. Consequently, the directory should list all firms that the recipient has certified, along with basic identifying information for the firm. Since certification under this rule pertains to the various kinds of work a firm's disadvantaged owners can control, it is important to list those kinds of work in the directory. For example, if a firm seeks to work in fields A, B, and C, but the recipient has determined that its disadvantaged owners can control its operations only with respect to A and B, then the directory would recite that the firm is certified to perform work as a DBE in fields A and B. The focus of the directory is intended to be eligibility. A directory is a list of firms that have been certified as eligible DBEs, with sufficient identifying information to permit interested firms to contact the DBEs. We do not intend to turn a recipient's directory into a comprehensive business resource manual. For example, information about firms' qualifications, geographical preferences for work, performance track record, capitalization, etc. are not required to be part of the directory. Some commenters favored including one or more of these elements, but we are concerned that other business information - however useful in its own right -- could clutter up the directory and dilute its focus on certification. §26.33 What steps must a recipient take to address overconcentration of DBEs in certain types of work? For some time, the Department has heard allegations that DBEs are overconcentrated in certain fields of highway construction work (e.g., guardrail, fencing, landscaping, traffic control, striping). The concern expressed is that there are so many DBEs in these areas that non-DBEs are frozen out of the opportunity to work. In an attempt to respond to these concerns, the SNPRM asked for comment on a series of options for "diversification" mechanisms, various incentives and disincentives designed to shift DBE participation to other types of work. The Department received a great deal of comment on these proposals, almost all of it negative. There were few comments suggesting that overconcentration was a serious problem, and many comments said that the alleged problem was not real. Some FTA and FAA recipients said that if there was a problem with overconcentration, it was limited to the highway construction program. As a general matter, recipients said that the proposed mechanisms were costly, cumbersome, and too prescriptive. Prime contractors opposed the provisions because they would make it more difficult for them to find DBEs with which to meet their goals, while DBEs opposed them because they felt the provisions would penalize success and force them out of areas of business in which they were experienced. Many commenters suggested using outreach or business development plans as ways of assisting DBEs to move into additional areas of work. The Department does not have data from commenters or other sources to support a finding that "overconcentration" is a serious, nationwide problem. However, as part of the narrow tailoring of the DBE program, we believe it would be useful to give recipients the authority to address overconcentration problems where they may occur. In keeping with the increased flexibility that this rule provides recipients, we give recipients discretion to identify situations where overconcentration is unduly burdening non-DBE firms. If a recipient finds an area of overconcentration, it would have to devise means of addressing the problem that work in their local situations. Possible means of dealing with the problem could include assisting prime contractors to find DBEs in non-traditional fields or varying the use of contract goals to lessen any burden on particular types of non-DBE specialty contractors. While recipients would have to obtain DOT approval of determinations of overconcentration and measures for dealing with them, the Department is not prescribing any specific mechanisms for doing so. §26.35 What role do business development and mentor-protégé programs have in the DBE program? In the SNPRM, both mentor-protégé programs and business development programs (BDPs) were cast as tools to use for diversification. They still may be used for that purpose, as noted in §26.33. However, the Department believes that they may have a broader application, and their use in the final rule is not limited to diversification purposes. BDPs, in particular, are good examples of race-neutral methods recipients can use to promote the participation of DBEs and other small businesses in their contracting programs. There were few comments on these provisions. Recipients wanted flexibility, and suggested that these kinds of programs should be optional. Their comments said that such programs were resource-intensive, and that Federal financial assistance for them would be welcome. One contractors' organization offered its own mentor-protégé plan as a model. A few comments voiced suspicion of mentor-protégé plans, on the basis that they allowed fronts and frauds into the program. The final rule makes the use of BDPs and mentor-protégé programs optional for recipients. An operating administration can direct a particular recipient to institute a BDP, but BDPs are not mandatory across the board. The operating administration would negotiate with the recipient before mandating a BDP. One feature added to this provision allows recipients to establish a kind of mini-graduation requirement for firms that voluntarily participate in BDPs. One of the purposes of a BDP is to equip DBE firms to compete in the market outside the DBE program. Therefore, a recipient could ask BDP participants to agree -- as a condition of receiving BDP assistance -- to agree to leave the DBE program after a certain number of years, or after certain business development objectives had been achieved. Standing alone, mentor-protégé programs are not an adequate substitute for the DBE program. While they can be an important tool to help selected firms, they cannot be counted on to level the playing field for DBEs in general. An effective mentor-protégé program requires close monitoring to guard against abuse, which further limits the number of DBEs they can assist. Even with these limits, a mentor-protégé program that has safeguards to prevent large non-DBE firms from circumventing the DBE program can be a useful component of a recipient's overall strategy to ensure equal opportunities for DBEs. The final rule includes safeguards intended to prevent the misuse of mentor-protégé programs. Only firms that a recipient has already certified as DBEs (necessarily including a determination that they are independent firms) can participate as protégés. This is intended to preclude non-DBE firms from creating captive DBE firms to serve as protégés. A non-DBE mentor firm cannot get credit for more than half its goal on any contract by using its own protégé. Moreover, a non-DBE mentor firm cannot get DBE credit for using its own protégé on more than every other contract performed by the protégé. That is, if Mentor Firm X uses Protégé Firm Y to perform a subcontract, X cannot get DBE credit for using Y on another subcontract until Y had first worked on an intervening prime contract or subcontract with a different prime contractor. To make mentor-protégé relationships feasible, the rule provides that mentors and protégés are not treated as affiliates of one another for size determination purposes. Mentor-protégé programs and BDPs must be approved by the concerned operating administration before they take effect. Recipients who already have such programs in place would make them part of their revised DBE programs sent to the concerned OA within 180 days of the effective date of part 26. §26.37 What are a recipient's responsibilities for monitoring the performance of other program participants? The few comments on this section asked for more detail and clarification. In the interest of flexibility, the Department is reluctant to be prescriptive in the matter of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. What we are looking for is a strong and effective set of monitoring and compliance provisions in each recipient's DBE program. These mechanisms could be most anything available to the recipient under Federal, state, or local law (e.g., liquidated damages provisions, responsibility determinations, suspension and debarment rules, etc.) One of the main purposes of these provisions is to make sure that DBEs actually perform work committed to them at contract award. The results that recipients must measure consist of payments actually made to DBEs, not just promises at the award stage. Credit toward goals can be awarded only when payments (including, for example, the return of retainage payments) are actually made to DBEs. Under the final rule, recipients would keep a running tally of the extent to which, on each contract, performance had matched promises. Prime contractors whose performance fell short of original commitments would be subject to the compliance mechanisms the recipient had made applicable. §26.41 What is the role of the statutory 10 percent goal in this program? This is a new section, intended to explain what role the 10 percent statutory goal plays in the DBE program. Under former part 23, the 10 percent figure derived from the statute had a role in the setting of overall goals by recipients. For example, if recipients had a goal of less than 10 percent, the rule required them to make a special justification. This section makes clear that the 10 percent goal is an aspirational goal that applies to the Department of Transportation on a national level, not to individual recipients. It is a goal that the Department can use to evaluate its overall national success in achieving the objectives that Congress has established for this program. However, the national 10 percent goal is not tied to recipients' goal-setting decisions. Recipients set goals based on what will achieve a level playing field for DBEs in their own programs, without regard to the national goal. Recipients are not required to set their overall or contract goals at 10 percent or any other particular level. Recipients are no longer required to make a special justification if their overall goals are less than 10 percent. As discussed in connection with the Congressional debate on the TEA-21 DBE provision, Congress viewed flexibility concerning the statutory 10 percent goal as an important feature of narrow tailoring and made clear that it was setting a national goal, not a goal for any individual recipient. The Department wants to ensure that state and local programs have sufficient flexibility to implement their programs in a narrowly tailored way. This section is part of the Department's effort toward that end. §26.43 Can recipients use quotas or set-asides as part of this program? The DBE program has often been labeled as a "quota" or "set-aside" program, especially, though not exclusively, by its opponents. This label is, and always has been, incorrect. Fifteen years ago, in the preamble to the Department's first rule implementing a DBE statute, the Department carefully specified that neither quotas nor set-asides were required (see 48 FR 33437-38; July 21, 1983). This remains true today. However, in light of Adarand and this year's Congressional debates on the DBE statutes, we believe this point deserves additional emphasis. This regulation prohibits quotas under any circumstances and makes clear that set-asides can only be used as a means of last resort for redressing egregious discrimination. A number of non-DBE contractors and their organizations continued to assert, in comments on the SNPRM, that the DBE program operates as a quota program. This section makes clear that recipients cannot use quotas on DOT-assisted contracts under any circumstances. A quota is a simple numerical requirement that a recipient or contractor must meet, without consideration of other factors. For example, if a recipient sets a 12 percent goal on a particular contract and refuses to award the contract to any bidder who does not have 12 percent DBE participation, either refusing to look at showings of good faith efforts or arbitrarily disregarding them, then the recipient has used a quota. The Department's regulations have never endorsed this practice. The issue of good faith efforts is discussed further below in connection with §26.51. A set-aside is a very specific tool. A contracting agency sets a contract aside for DBEs if it permits no one but DBEs to compete for the contract. Firms other than DBEs are not eligible to bid. The Department's DBE program has never required the use of set-asides and has allowed recipients to use set-asides only under very limited circumstances. Under the SNPRM, a recipient could use a set-aside on a DOT-assisted contract only if other methods of meeting overall goals were demonstrated to be unavailing and the recipient had legal authority independent of part 26. Comments were divided concerning the use of set-asides. A number of non-DBE contractors opposed the use of set-asides, some of them saying that set-asides might be something they could live with if their use were balanced by the elimination of DBE contract goals on other contracts in the same field. Some recipients and DBEs said, however, that set-asides were a useful tool to achieve goals, particularly for start-up contractors or small contracts. The Department has carefully reviewed these comments and continues to believe that set-asides should not be used in the DBE program unless they are absolutely necessary to address a specific problem when no other means would suffice. If a recipient has been unable to remedy the effects of egregious discrimination through other means, it may, as a last resort, make limited use of set-asides to the extent necessary to resolve the problem. §26.45 How do recipients set overall goals? Since its inception, the recipient's overall goal has been the heart of the DBE program. Responding to Adarand, DOT clarified the theory and purpose of the overall goal in the SNPRM. In the proposed rule, the Department made clear that the purpose of the overall goal -- and, in fact, the DBE program as a whole -- is to achieve a "level playing field" for DBEs seeking to participate in federal-aid transportation contracting. To reach a level playing field, recipients need to examine their programs and their markets and determine the amount of participation they would expect DBEs to achieve in the absence of discrimination and the effects of past discrimination. The focus of the goal section of the SNPRM was to propose ways to measure what a level playing field would look like and to seek input on the availability of data to make such a measurement. The Proposed Rule and Comments The Department proposed several options that recipients might use for setting overall goals, including three alternative formulas for measuring the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in local markets. The specific formulas will be discussed below, but generally, they each called for setting a goal that reflected the percentage of locally available firms that were DBEs (i.e. dividing the number of DBEs by the number of all businesses). On all of the alternatives, the SNPRM sought comments on both the feasibility and practical value of the options, as well as the prospects for combining any of the approaches and the question of whether to mandate a single approach or allow each recipient to chose amongst the options. We invited commenters to propose changes to any of the details of the options or to devise entirely new ones. Finally, we asked commenters for their input on the availability of reliable data for use with each of the options. Hundreds of commenters of all types -- including DBEs and non-DBEs, prime and subcontractors, state and local recipients, industry and interest groups and private individuals -- responded with a wealth of feedback, opinions and data. It is an understatement to say that there was no consensus among commenters as to the best way to set overall goals. Support for the proposed options was almost evenly spread over the choices presented, with many commenters firmly against all of the options. Still more suggested that the current, non-formulaic method was the best way to ensure the flexibility to respond to local market conditions. Similarly, among those who expressed an opinion, commenters were split between the propriety of choosing a single "best" method and imposing it on all recipients and allowing recipients to choose amongst all the options. One of the few universal themes in the goal-setting comments was the problem of the availability of reliable data on the number of DBE and non-DBE contractors. There were a few common threads that different groups of commenters tended to apply to all of the formulas. Among recipients, many comments focused on the lack of data about non-DBE contractors, especially subcontractors. Recipients often noted that they would not have the information needed for the denominator of any of the formulas (i.e. the total number of available businesses). Non-DBE contractors -- and industry groups representing them -- generally believed that there should be a capacity measure built into any goal setting mechanism. Finally, DBEs -- and their industry associations -- were concerned that all of the formulas would create goals based only on the current number of DBEs, locking in the effects of past discrimination by ignoring the fact that the lack of opportunities in the past has suppressed the number of DBE firms available today. Under the proposed rule's Alternative 1, recipients would calculate the percentage of DBE firms in their directories among all firms available to work on their DOT-assisted contracts. Under Alternative 2, recipients would calculate the percentage of all minority- and women-owned firms in certain SIC codes in their areas among all firms in these SIC codes in the same areas. Under Alternative 3, recipients would calculate a percentage based on the average number of DBE firms that had worked on their DOT-assisted contracts in recent years divided by the average number of all firms that had worked on their DOT-assisted contracts in the same period. The SNPRM also proposed that recipients could use other means, such a disparity studies or goals developed by other recipients serving the same area, as a basis for their goals. Each of the three proposed alternatives received some support, though this was often the rather tepid endorsement of commenters who felt that one or another alternative was the best of a bad lot. Non-DBE contractors often claimed that the alternatives would unfairly increase goals, while DBE contractors often claimed that the same proposals would unfairly decrease goals. Commenters said that data for determining the denominators of the equations in Alternatives 1 and 2, as well as the numerator in Alternative 2, did not exist and that it would be a major, time-consuming job to begin to obtain the data. Adaptation of existing information from other sources (e.g., Census data) was said to have significant statistical difficulties. The difficulty of getting data on out-of-state firms was emphasized in some comments. Commenters looked on the alternatives as cumbersome, creating unreasonable administrative burdens, and as producing statistical results that were skewed in various ways. The use of DBE directories as the source of the numerator in Alternative 1 was criticized on the basis that directories may contain firms that never actually participate in DOT-assisted contracts. It was suggested that the number of firms bidding rather than the number of firms certified would be a more reliable guide, but it was also pointed out that, because subcontractors seldom formally bid for work, this data would be hard to obtain. Some commenters proposed adding overall population statistics to the mix. A significant number of commenters -- primarily non-DBE contractors, but including some recipients and other commenters as well -- emphasized the need to take "capacity" into account. Most popular among these comments was using a capacity version of Alternative 3. These comments did not propose a method of determining the capacity of the firms contracting with the recipient. The Final Rule In view of the complexity and importance of the goal setting process and the many issues raised by commenters, the Department has decided to adopt a two step process for goal setting. The process is intended to provide the maximum flexibility for recipients while ensuring that goals are based on the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in each recipient's relevant market. The Department believes that this approach is critical to meeting our constitutional obligation to ensure that the program is narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of discrimination. The first step of the process will be to create a baseline figure for the relative availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in each recipient's market. The second step will be to make adjustments from the base figure, relying on an examination of additional evidence, past experience, local expertise and anticipated changes in DOT-assisted contracting over the coming year. Step 1: Determining a Base Figure for the Overall Goal The base figure is intended to be a measurement of the current percentage of ready, willing and able businesses that are DBEs. Ensuring that this figure is based on demonstrable evidence of each recipient's relevant market conditions will help to ensure that the program remains narrowly tailored. To be explicit, recipients cannot simply use the 10 percent national goal, their goal from the previous year, or their DBE participation level from the previous year as their base figure. Instead, all recipients must take an actual measurement of their marketplace, using the best evidence they have available, and derive a base figure that is as fair and accurate a representation as possible of the percentage of available businesses that are DBEs. There are many different ways to measure the contracting market and assess the relative availability of DBEs. As discussed above, the SNPRM proposed three alternate formulas to measure relative availability, none of which were particularly popular with commenters. In this final rule, the Department is placing primary emphasis on the principles underlying the measurement, mandating only that a measurement of the relative availability of DBEs be made on the basis of demonstrable evidence of relevant market conditions, rather than requiring that any particular procedure or formula be used. The final rule contains a number of examples of how to create a base figure which recipients are free to adopt in their entirety or to use as guidelines for how to devise their own measurement. There are several reasons we have taken this approach. First, the Department is aware of the differences in available data in various markets across the nation. The flexibility inherent in this approach will ensure that all recipients can use the procedure to set a reasonable goal and allow each recipient to use the best data available to it. As discussed in another section, this rule will also provide for the development of more standard data for future goal setting. Second, for many recipients, setting goals in this way will be a new exercise. By fixing only the basic principle, but allowing the methodology to change, recipients will have the opportunity to fine tune the process each year as their experience grows and the data available to them improve. Finally, the rule makes sure that every recipient will have at least one reasonable and practical goal setting method available to them. The first example for setting a base figure relies on data sources that are immediately available to all recipients: their DBE directories, and a Census Bureau database that DOT and the Census Bureau will make available to all recipients that wish to use it. This example has its roots in the first two goal setting formulas proposed in the SNPRM. Recipients would first assess the number of ready, willing and able DBEs based on their own directories. For some recipients this will be as simple as counting the number of firms in their directory. For others, particularly those using directories maintained by other agencies, the directories will have to be "filtered" for firms involved in transportation contracting. The resulting number of DBEs would become the numerator. The denominator would then be derived from the Census Bureau's County Business Pattern (CBP) database. We will provide user-friendly electronic access to the database via the internet to allow recipients to input the geographic area and SIC codes in which they contract and receive a number for the availability of all businesses. There are several issues that must be addressed when comparing numbers derived from two different data sources, some of which were raised in the comments on the SNPRM. Recipients will need to ensure that the scope of businesses included in the numerator is as close as possible to the scope included in the denominator. Using as close as possible to the same SIC codes and geographic base is very important. A recipient using its own DBE directory, particularly one that contains only firms in the fields in which it contracts, will still need to determine what fields it will use for the denominator when sorting through the CBP database. The best way to do this would be to examine their contracting program and determine the SIC codes in which they let the substantial majority of their contracts and subcontracts. The geographic area used for both the numerator and the denominator should cover the area from which the recipient draws the substantial majority of its contractors. While it may be sufficient for some state recipients to use their state borders as their contracting area, local transit and airport recipients will rarely have such an obvious choice. Those recipients will need to more carefully examine the geographic area from which they draw contractors and base their calculation of both the numerator and denominator of the equation on the same area. The Department and the Census Bureau will make the CBP data available in a format that gives recipients as much flexibility as possible to tailor the data to their contracting programs. Recipients will be able to extract the data in one block for all of the SIC codes they expect to contract in, or by individual SIC codes, allowing them to weight the relative availability of DBEs in various fields, giving more weight to the fields in which they spend more money. For example, let us assume a recipient estimates that it will expend 10% of its federal aid funds within SIC code 15, 40% in SIC code 16, 25% in SIC code 17, and the remaining 25% on contracting spread over SIC codes 07, 42 and 87. The recipient could separately determine the relative availability of DBEs for each of the three major construction SIC codes (i.e., 15, 16 and 17) and the relative availability of DBEs in the other three SIC codes grouped together and weight each according to the amount of money to be spent in each area. In this example, the recipient could calculate its weighted base figure by first determining the number of DBEs in its directory for each of the groups, then extracting the availability of CBP businesses for the same groups. It would then perform the following calculation to arrive at a base figure for step one of the goal setting process: Base = [.10 (DBEs in SIC 15) + .40(DBEs in 16) + .25(DBEs in 17) + .25 (DBEs in 07,42,87) ] x 100 Figure CBPs in SIC 15 CBPs in 16 CBPs in 17 CBPs in 07,42,87 As has been stated generally, this formula is offered only as an example of a way that a recipient could choose to use the CBP database. Recipients using the CBP data should choose whether to weight their calculation, and whether to do so by individual SIC codes or by groups of SIC codes, based on their own assessment of what method will best fit their spending pattern.1 Finally, there is still the question of the propriety of comparing data from two sources as different as DBE directories and the CBP. As mentioned above, some commenters asserted that the directories may contain firms that do not normally perform DOT-assisted contracts. This problem is greatest, of course, for directories maintained by other agencies for purposes beyond DOT-assisted contracting. We believe that the recipient's knowledge of its contracting needs and the contents of its DBE directory will allow it to solve this problem by sorting the directories by SIC code to extract only the firms likely to be interested in DOT-assisted contracting. Any remaining effect from DBEs that are certified in the relevant SIC codes but still do not intend to compete for DOT-assisted contracts will be more than offset by the hurdles involved in actually becoming a DBE. It is important to note here that the certification process itself, with its paperwork, review and on-site inspection, create a filter on the number of existing firms that will be counted in the numerator without there being any equivalent filter culling firms out of the denominator. Ultimately, the Department chose these two data sources for the example because, while they may not be perfect, they represent the best universally available current data on both the presence of DBEs and the presence of all businesses in local markets. Any recipient that believes it has available to it better sources of local data from which to make a similar calculation for its base figure is encouraged to use them. The second example for calculating a base figure is using a bidders list to determine the relative availability of DBEs. The concept is similar to the one described above. The recipient would divide the number of available ready, willing and able DBEs by the number for all firms. The difference is that instead of measuring availability by DBE certifications and Census data, the recipient would measure availability by the number of firms that have directly participated in, or attempted to participate in, DOT-assisted contracting in the recent past. This approach has its roots in Alternative 3 from the SNPRM. Of fundamental importance to this approach is that the recipient would need to include all firms that have sought DOT-assisted contracts, regardless of whether they did so by bidding on a prime contract or quoting a job as a subcontractor. Because most DOT recipients derive the substantial majority of their DBE participation through subcontracting, it is absolutely essential that all DBE and non-DBE firms that quote subcontracts be included in the bidders list.2 Bidders lists are a very focussed measure of ready, willing and able firms because they filter the pool of available firms by requiring a demonstration of their ability to participate in the process through tracking and identifying contracting opportunities, understanding the requirements of a particular job and assembling a bid for it. Another attractive feature of the bidding "filter" is that it applies equally to both DBEs and non-DBEs. The third example included in the final rule for setting a base figure is using data derived from a disparity study. As was discussed in the SNPRM, the Department is not requiring recipients to do a disparity study, but is only making clear that use of disparity study data by recipients that have them or choose to conduct them is a valid means of setting a goal. Disparity studies generally contain a wide array of statistical data, as well as anecdotal data and analysis that can be particularly useful in the goal setting process. We list disparity studies here, not because they are needed to justify operating the DBE program - Congress has already established the compelling need for the DBE program - but because the data a good disparity study provides can be an excellent guide for a recipient to use to set a narrowly tailored goal. The Department will not set out specific requirements for what data or analysis is required before a disparity study can be used for setting a goal, because we believe that the design and conduct of the study is best left to the local officials and the professional organizations with which they contract to conduct the studies. Instead, we again offer simple general principles that should apply to all studies used for goal setting. Any study data relied on in the goal setting process should be as recent as possible and be focussed on the transportation contracting industry. When setting the goal, first use the study's statistical evidence to set a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs. Other study information, whether it is anecdotal data, analysis or statistical information about related fields, should be included when making adjustments to the base figure (discussed in more detail below), but not included in the base figure for the relative availability of DBEs. The last specific example included in the rule is using the goal of another recipient as the base figure for goal setting. This option was also included in the SNPRM. It is intended to avoid duplicative work and to lighten the burden the goal setting process might put on smaller recipients. It is important to note that a recipient could only use another recipient's goal if it was set in accordance with this rule and the other recipient performed similar contracting in a similar market area. Using another recipient's approved goal would only satisfy the first step of the goal setting process. It would serve as the base figure, and could not be used to skip over step two of the process. The recipient would need to examine the same additional evidence it would otherwise use to determine whether to adjust its goal from the base figure, as well as being required to make adjustments to account for differences in its local market or contracting program. The final rule also maintains the option of devising an alternative method of calculating a base figure for the goal setting process. Explicitly listing this option serves to emphasize the point that the options in the rule are examples meant as guidelines intended to ensure maximum flexibility for recipients. Recipients can use this option to take advantage of their unique expertise or any unique source of data that they have that may not be available to other recipients. The concerned operating administration will review and approve the proposals of recipients that believe they can calculate a base figure that will better reflect their relevant market than any of the examples provided in this rule. Approval will be contingent on the proposal's following the same principles that apply to any recipient: the methodology must be based on demonstrable data of relevant market conditions and be designed to reach a goal that the recipient would expect DBEs to achieve in the absence of discrimination. Step 2: Adjusting the Base Figure As alluded to above, measuring the relative availability of DBEs to derive a base figure is only the first step of the goal setting process. To ensure that they arrive at goals that truly and accurately reflect the participation they would expect absent the effects of discrimination, recipients must go beyond the formulaic measurement of current availability to account for other evidence of conditions affecting DBEs. To accomplish this second step, recipients must first survey their jurisdiction to determine what types of relevant evidence is available to them. Then, relying on their own knowledge of their contracting markets they must review the evidence to determine whether either an up or down adjustment from the base figure is needed. One universally available form of evidence that all recipients should consider is the proven capacity of DBEs to perform work on DOT-assisted contracts. All recipients have been tracking and reporting the dollar volume of work that is contracted and subcontracted to DBEs each year. Viewed in isolation, the past achievements of DBEs do not reflect the availability of DBEs relative to all available businesses, but it is an important and current measure of the ability of DBEs to perform on DOT-assisted contracts. Though not universally available, there are hundreds of existing disparity studies that contain a wealth of statistical and anecdotal evidence on the utilization of disadvantaged businesses. In addition to being a possible source of data for Step 1 of the goal setting process, disparity studies should be considered during Step 2 of the process. The base figure from Step 1 is intended to determine the relative availability of DBEs. The data and analysis in a disparity study can help a recipient determine whether those existing businesses are under- or over-utilized. If a recipient has a study with disparity ratios showing that existing DBEs are receiving significantly less work than expected, an upward adjustment from the base figure is called for. Similarly, if the disparity ratio shows overutilization, a downward adjustment to the base figure would be warranted. The anecdotal evidence and analysis of contracting requirements and conditions that may have a discriminatory impact on DBEs are also important sources that should be examined when determining what adjustment to make to the base figure.3 Finally, disparity studies that are conducted within a recipient's jurisdiction should be examined even if they were not done specifically for the recipient. For example, a state highway agency may find useful data and analysis in either a statewide disparity study covering other agencies or in a disparity study examining contracting in a county or city within the state. If a recipient uses another recipient's goal as its base figure under Step 1 of the goal setting process, it will have to make additional adjustments to ensure that its final goal is narrowly tailored to its market and contracting program. For example, if a local transit or airport authority adopts a statewide goal as its base figure, it must determine the extent that local relative availability of DBEs differs from the relative availability of DBEs in the contracting area relied on by the state. The local recipient would also need to examine the differences in the type of contracting work in its program and determine whether there are significant differences in the relative availability of DBEs in any fields that are unique to its program - or unique to the program of the other recipient. Similarly, if one local recipient used the goal of another local recipient in the same market as its base figure, it would also need to adjust for differences in the contracting fields used by the two programs. Finally, the rule contains a brief list of other types of data a recipient could consider when adjusting its base figure to arrive at an overall goal. The list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Instead, it is meant as a guide to the types of information a recipient should look for in Step 2 of the goal setting process. There is a wide array of relevant local, regional and national information about the utilization of disadvantaged businesses. Recipients are encouraged to cast as wide a net as they can to carefully examine their contracting programs and the public and private markets in which they operate. Additional Goal Setting Issues The Department proposed, in both the 1992 NPRM and the 1997 SNPRM, that overall goals be calculated as a percentage of DOT funds a recipient expects to expend in DOT-assisted contracts. This is different from the existing part 23 rule, which asked recipients to set overall goals on the basis of all funds, including state and local funds, to be expended in DOT-assisted contracts. This change is for accounting and administrative convenience and is not intended to have a substantive effect on the program. While not the subject of many comments, those who did comment on the proposal favored the change. The final rule adopts this approach. A few recipients commented that public participation concerning goal setting was bothersome. Nevertheless, we view it as an essential part of the goal setting process. There are many stakeholders involved in setting goals, and it is reasonable that they should be involved in the process and have an opportunity for comment. The part 23 provision requiring getting a state governor's approval of a goal of less than 10 percent has been eliminated, both because overall goals are no longer tied to the national 10 percent goal and to reduce administrative burdens. The goal setting provision of the final rule continues to direct recipients to set one annual overall goal for DBEs, rather than group-specific goals separating minority and women-owned businesses. §26.47 Can recipients be penalized for failing to meet overall goals? This is a new section of the regulation, the purpose of which is to clarify the Department's views on the situations in which it is appropriate to impose sanctions on recipients with respect to goals. The provision states explicitly what has long been the Department's policy: no recipient is sanctioned, or found in noncompliance, simply because it fails to meet its overall goal. In fact, through the history of the DBE program, the Department never has sanctioned a recipient for failing to obtain a particular amount of DBE participation. On the other hand, if a recipient fails to set an overall goal which the concerned operating administration approves, or fails to operate its program in good faith toward the objective of meeting the goal, it is subject to a finding of noncompliance and possible sanctions. For example, if a recipient refuses to establish a goal or, having established one, does little or nothing to work toward attaining it, it would be reasonable for the Department to find the recipient in noncompliance. Like all compliance provisions of the rule, this provision is subject to the "court order" exception recently created by statute (see §26.101 (b)). §26.49 How are overall goals established for transit vehicle manufacturers? This provision basically continues in effect the existing transit vehicle manufacturer (TVM) provisions of the rule. The SNPRM proposed to change the existing rule in two respects. FHWA or FAA recipients could avail themselves of similar provisions, if they chose. The final rule retains this flexibility. Also, it was proposed that FTA, rather than manufacturers, would set TVM goals. The few comments we received on this section objected to the latter change. Consequently, we will not adopt the proposed change and will continue to require the TVMs themselves to set their own goals based on the principles outlined in §26.45 of this rule. §26.51 What means do recipients use to meet overall goals? One of the key points of both the SNPRM and this final rule is that, in meeting overall goals, recipients have to give priority to race-neutral means. By race-neutral means (a term which, for purposes of this rule, includes gender neutrality), we mean outreach, technical assistance, procurement process modification, etc. -- measures which can be used to increase opportunities for all small businesses, not just DBEs, and do not involve setting specific goals for the use of DBEs on individual contracts. Contract goals, on the other hand, are race-conscious measures. In the context of these definitions, it is important to note that awards of contracts to DBEs are not necessarily race-conscious actions. Whenever a DBE receives a prime contract because it is the lowest responsible bidder, the resulting DBE participation was achieved through race-neutral means. Similarly, when a DBE receives a subcontract on a project that does not have a contract goal, its participation was also achieved through race-neutral means. Finally, even on projects that do carry contract goals, when a prime awards a particular subcontract to a DBE because it has proven in the past that it does the best or quickest work, or because it submitted the lowest quote, the resulting DBE participation has, in fact, been achieved through race-neutral means. We also note that the use of race-neutral measures (e.g., outreach, technical assistance) specifically to increase the participation of DBEs does not convert these measures into race-conscious measures. A number of non-DBE contractors commented that race-neutral measures should not only be given priority, but must be tried and fail before any use of contract goals can occur. This, they asserted, is essential for a program to be narrowly tailored. The law on this point is fairly clear, and does not support the commenters' contention. The extent to which race-neutral alternatives were considered and deemed inadequate to remedy the problem is the relevant narrow tailoring question. Both in past legislation and when considering TEA-21, Congress did consider race-neutral alternatives. In fact, as described above, throughout the debate, Member after Member gave examples of how state and local race-neutral programs without goals fail to overcome the discriminatory barriers that face DBEs. Congress' careful consideration and conclusion that race-neutral means are insufficient, buttressed by this rule's emphasis on achieving as much of the goal as possible through race-neutral means, satisfies this part of the narrow tailoring requirement. No one opposed the use of race-neutral means, though a number of DBEs and recipients stressed that these means, standing alone, were insufficient to address discrimination and its effects. Most recipients and non-DBE contractors supported the use of race-neutral measures, though some recipients said that increased use of these measures would require additional resources. The relationship between race-conscious and race-neutral measures in the final rule is very important. The recipient establishes an overall goal. The recipient estimates, in advance, what part of that goal it can meet through the use of race-neutral means. This projection, and the basis for it, would be provided to the concerned operating administration at the same time as the overall goal, and is subject to OA approval. The requirement of the rule is that the recipient get the maximum feasible DBE participation through race-neutral means. The recipient uses race-conscious measures (e.g., sets contract goals) to get the remainder of the DBE participation it needs to meet the overall goal. If the recipient expects to be able to meet its entire overall goal through race-neutral means, it could, with OA approval, implement its program without any use of contract goals. For example, suppose Recipient X establishes an 11 percent overall goal for Fiscal Year 2000. This is the amount of DBE participation that X has determined it would have if the playing field were level. Recipient X projects that, using a combination of race-neutral means, it can achieve 5 percent DBE participation. Recipient X then sets contract goals on some of its contracts throughout the year to bring in an additional 6 percent DBE participation. Recipients would keep data separately on the DBE participation obtained through those contracts that either did or did not involve the use of contract goals. Recipients would use this and other data to adjust their use of race-neutral means and contract goals during the remainder of the year and in future years. For example, if Recipient X projected being able to attain 5 percent DBE participation through race-neutral measures, but was only able to obtain 1 percent from the race-neutral measures it used, Recipient X would increase its future use of contract goals. On the other hand, if Recipient X exceeded its prediction that it would get 5 percent DBE participation from race-neutral measures and actually obtained 10 percent DBE participation from the contracts on which there were no contract goals, it would reduce its future use of contract goals. A recipient that was consistently able to meet its overall goal using only race-neutral measures would never need to use contract goals. Most recipients and non-DBE contractors agreed with the SNPRM's proposal that (contrary to the part 23 provision on this subject) contract goals not be required on all contracts. This provision is retained in the final rule. We believe that this provision provides recipients the ability to achieve the objective of a narrowly tailored program. The rule also reiterates that the contract goal need not be set at the same level as the overall goal. To express this more clearly, let us return to the above example of Recipient X. Just because Recipient X has an overall goal of 11 percent, it does not have to set a contract goal on each contract. Nor does it have to establish an 11 percent goal on each contract on which it does set a contract goal. Indeed, since X has projected that it can achieve almost half of its overall goal through race-neutral means, it would most likely set contract goals on some contracts but not on others. On contracts with a contract goal, the goal might be 4 percent one time, 18 percent another time, 9 percent another time, depending on the actual work involved in each contract, the location of the work and the subcontracting opportunities available. The idea is for X to set contract goals that, cumulatively over the year, bring in 6 percent DBE participation, which, added to the 5 percent participation X projects achieving from race-neutral measures, ends up meeting the 11 percent overall goal. The SNPRM asked for comment on evaluation credits as an additional race-conscious measure that recipients could use to meet overall goals. The vast majority of the many comments on this subject opposed the use of evaluation credits, on both legal (e.g., as contrary to narrow tailoring) and policy (e.g., as confusing and subjective) grounds. A smaller number of commenters favored at least giving recipients discretion to use this tool. While the Department does not agree with the contention that evaluation credits are legally suspect, we do agree with much of the sentiment against using them in the DBE program, particularly the practical difficulties they might involve when applied to subcontracting (which constitutes the main source of DBE participation in the program). As a result, the final rule does not contain an evaluation credits provision. The SNPRM proposed certain mechanisms for determining when it was appropriate to ratchet back the use of contract goals. Most commenters said they found these particular mechanisms complicated and confusing. The Department believes that, as a matter of narrow tailoring, it is important to have concrete mechanisms in place to ensure that race-conscious measures like contract goals are used only to the extent necessary to ensure a level playing field. The final rule contains examples of four such mechanisms. The first mechanism applies to a situation in which a recipient estimates that it can meet its overall goal exclusively through the use of race-neutral goals. In this case, the recipient simply does not set contract goals during the year. The second mechanism takes this approach one step further. If the recipient meets its overall goal two years in a row using only race-neutral measures, the recipient continues to use only race-neutral measures in future years, without having to project each year how much of its overall goal it anticipates meeting through race-neutral and race-conscious means, respectively. However, if in any year the recipient does not meet its overall goal, the recipient must make the projection for the following year, using race-conscious means as needed to meet the goal. The third mechanism applies to recipients who exceed their overall goals for two years in a row while using contract goals. In the third year, when setting their overall goal and making their projection of the amount of DBE participation they will achieve through race-neutral means, they would determine the average percentage by which they exceeded their overall goals in the two previous years. They would then use that percentage to reduce their reliance on contract goals in the coming year, as noted in the regulatory text example. The rationale for this reduction is that the recipient's overall goal represents it